Kukla on Sexual Negotiation (III): Gift Offers
Rebecca Kukla (“That’s what she said”) suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is the third part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of gift offers.
Rebecca Kukla suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is third part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of gift offers.
Kukla is interested in expanding our vocabulary for sexual ethics beyond mere consent and refusal. Along with invitations, she think sex is sometimes initiated by the offer of a gift. Further, she claims that sexual gifts do not fit into the standard framework of consent. A gift aims to fulfill someone thing the other person wants and is offered out of generosity, rather than a mutual interest. Suppose my partner really loves a particular sexual position but I don’t. I may occasionally offer that kind of sex as a gift in an act of generousity. Kukla claims this departs from the traditional model of consent in that it’s a kind of ethical sex that doesn’t require enthuasistic desire from both parties. (Then again one might find that odd. Unenthusiastically offering gifts doesn’t seem too generous while mutual desire does not seem like a necessary component of consent.)
Kukla also draws an interesting connection between sexual gift offers and a long-standing literature on gifts in anthropology and sociology. As Mauss points out, gifts have a paradoxical structure. On one hand, they are supposed to be freely given and generous. On the other, they create obligations for reciprocation. This makes the art of gift giving a delicate practice in navigating social norms. Failing to reciprocate a gift at all can be a serious norm violation but so can reciprocating it at the wrong time, with the wrong thing, or in the wrong way. This means that sexual gifts are typically only appropriate in long-standing, committed relationships where it is permissible to put an obligation on one’s partner.
Gifts are also supposed to depart from the consent model in that they cannot be requested, and consent is something offered in response to a request. If they are requested then they are favours, not gifts. Our class didn’t think the distinction between favours and gifts was entirely clear. Here are two issues.
First, the line between gift and favour can be blurred during negotiation. Suppose your partner comes home after a long day at work. Typically, they do the dishes. But you offer to do them out of generosity. Your partner responds by saying, “actually, I’m fine doing the dishes, but you could really help me if you take out the trash.” In this scenario, you initiated a gift offer but you missed slightly in guessing what your partner’s desires were and they steer your toward a more fulfilling gift. Kukla would say that, when you are taking out the trash, you are responding to a favour, not offering a gift. But it seems odd to think a gift transforms into a favour the moment your partner suggests the trash instead. It seems like the act has all the characteristic features of a gift, minus the fact it’s a response to a request.
Second, many of our paradigmatic gift-giving practices operate through requests. Consider wish lists at birthdays and Christmas. Like the case above, wish lists are giving suggestions as to how someone could fulfill your desires more reliably. They are designed to minimize the possibility that someone gives you something you didn’t actually want. But Kukla looks like she may be committed to saying that these aren’t gifts at all, they are favours. But this seems odd, given that Christmas gifts bought off a list have all the characteristic features of a gift, minus the fact it’s a response to a request.
One way way Kukla could analyze these cases is to say that the giver is offering an open-end gift without specific content. What this means by that is the giver is offering to do something generous for the receiver but they are flexible as to nature of the gift when they make the offer. In the first case, when you offer to do the dishes, what you are really doing is offering to help with some chore of your partner’s choosing. In the second case, when you offer to buy a Christmas present, you are offering to buy some item from a list.
However, regardless of whether we should use gift-giving terminology or favour-doing terminology to describe what is going on when we offer our partners types of sex that we ourselves don’t particularly enjoy, Kukla makes the important point that this type of sex, though sometimes ethical, is not easily captured by discussion of sex that focuses on consent.
Author note: this post was written collectively by the seminar participants.
This is the third part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of gift offers.
Rebecca Kukla suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is third part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of gift offers.
Kukla is interested in expanding our vocabulary for sexual ethics beyond mere consent and refusal. Along with invitations, she think sex is sometimes initiated by the offer of a gift. Further, she claims that sexual gifts do not fit into the standard framework of consent. A gift aims to fulfill someone thing the other person wants and is offered out of generosity, rather than a mutual interest. Suppose my partner really loves a particular sexual position but I don’t. I may occasionally offer that kind of sex as a gift in an act of generousity. Kukla claims this departs from the traditional model of consent in that it’s a kind of ethical sex that doesn’t require enthuasistic desire from both parties. (Then again one might find that odd. Unenthusiastically offering gifts doesn’t seem too generous while mutual desire does not seem like a necessary component of consent.)
Kukla also draws an interesting connection between sexual gift offers and a long-standing literature on gifts in anthropology and sociology. As Mauss points out, gifts have a paradoxical structure. On one hand, they are supposed to be freely given and generous. On the other, they create obligations for reciprocation. This makes the art of gift giving a delicate practice in navigating social norms. Failing to reciprocate a gift at all can be a serious norm violation but so can reciprocating it at the wrong time, with the wrong thing, or in the wrong way. This means that sexual gifts are typically only appropriate in long-standing, committed relationships where it is permissible to put an obligation on one’s partner.
Gifts are also supposed to depart from the consent model in that they cannot be requested, and consent is something offered in response to a request. If they are requested then they are favours, not gifts. Our class didn’t think the distinction between favours and gifts was entirely clear. Here are two issues.
First, the line between gift and favour can be blurred during negotiation. Suppose your partner comes home after a long day at work. Typically, they do the dishes. But you offer to do them out of generosity. Your partner responds by saying, “actually, I’m fine doing the dishes, but you could really help me if you take out the trash.” In this scenario, you initiated a gift offer but you missed slightly in guessing what your partner’s desires were and they steer your toward a more fulfilling gift. Kukla would say that, when you are taking out the trash, you are responding to a favour, not offering a gift. But it seems odd to think a gift transforms into a favour the moment your partner suggests the trash instead. It seems like the act has all the characteristic features of a gift, minus the fact it’s a response to a request.
Second, many of our paradigmatic gift-giving practices operate through requests. Consider wish lists at birthdays and Christmas. Like the case above, wish lists are giving suggestions as to how someone could fulfill your desires more reliably. They are designed to minimize the possibility that someone gives you something you didn’t actually want. But Kukla looks like she may be committed to saying that these aren’t gifts at all, they are favours. But this seems odd, given that Christmas gifts bought off a list have all the characteristic features of a gift, minus the fact it’s a response to a request.
One way way Kukla could analyze these cases is to say that the giver is offering an open-end gift without specific content. What this means by that is the giver is offering to do something generous for the receiver but they are flexible as to nature of the gift when they make the offer. In the first case, when you offer to do the dishes, what you are really doing is offering to help with some chore of your partner’s choosing. In the second case, when you offer to buy a Christmas present, you are offering to buy some item from a list.
However, regardless of whether we should use gift-giving terminology or favour-doing terminology to describe what is going on when we offer our partners types of sex that we ourselves don’t particularly enjoy, Kukla makes the important point that this type of sex, though sometimes ethical, is not easily captured by discussion of sex that focuses on consent.
Author note: this post was written collectively by the seminar participants.
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