Kukla on Sexual Negotiation (II): Invitations
Rebecca Kukla (“That’s what she said”) suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is the second part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of invitations.
Rebecca Kukla suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is the second part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of invitations.
On Kukla’s view, invitations are a distinct category of speech acts which, along with gift offers (the subject of our next post), are an undertheorized kind of speech act for initiating sexual encounters. In fact, according to Kukla, most sex is initiated via invitation. It is characteristic of invitations that they leave the invited party free to decline without having transgressed, and the invitation must be welcoming (it cannot be indifferent). Kukla uses a dinner invitation to highlight these characteristic features; when extending an invitation, it is neither appropriate to say “if you don’t come, never mind, it doesn’t matter”, nor “I want you to come, and if you don’t I’ll be hurt”.
Invitations are an especially appropriate and common way to initiate a first sexual encounter with someone, as they are less presumptuous than requests or gift offers are. When an appropriate invitation is made, the possibility of sex is made available. Characteristically, the possibility is not neutral, the inviter hopes that the invitation will be accepted. Acceptance, on Kukla’s view, is one possible response to an invitation; the other obvious option is to decline. Kukla says that consent is not an appropriate response to an invitation, but rather something that one does or does not give when a request is made. As such, consent is not present in the initiation of most sexual activity; measuring the moral status of sex by the presence of consent upon initiation, then, is probably a wrongheaded way to think about sexual ethics.
Although our seminar found Kukla’s claim that consent is an inappropriate response to an invitation interesting, we were not all persuaded. That said, we did find that the idea that many sexual encounters are initiated through invitations to be a convincing one. We wondered why we shouldn’t think that one could consent to an invitation — indeed, whether accepting one counts as consenting to it.
Kukla argues that invitations are governed by social norms of propriety; we are not at liberty to issue any invitation we want just because the recipient is free to turn it down. For instance, it is inappropriate (and possibly insulting) to invite a stranger walking down the street to have sex with me. Likewise, there are norms that govern appropriate responses to having received an invitation. When an invitation is turned down, the recipient of the invitation offers their regrets and may provide a reason for their absence. Backing out of an invitation that has previously been accepted will also call for an expression of regret and an explanation. Not all explanations are acceptable; Kukla writes, “saying “I simply don’t feel like it any more” is not an acceptable reason to back out of a typical accepted invitation”. These norms also bear on the appropriate response of the party extending the invitation: Kukla believes that while rejection may be disappointing, the inviting party “has no license to feel aggrieved if the invitation is turned down”. The inviting party may, however, be aggrieved if acceptance is withdrawn in a cavalier manner.
Kukla argues that sexual invitations are peculiar in several ways with respect to the norms of propriety that govern them. Unlike other types of invitations, a sexual invitation may be declined without expression of regret, and acceptance of the invitation may be revoked at any time for any reason. She reasons that this special feature — being free to revoke acceptance at any time without justification and without having wronged the person who issued the invitation — may be common to all invitations to participate in “intimate bodily activities”. Another way in which sexual invitations are unique is that we do not typically think we owe an expression of gratitude if invited to have sex with someone. This intuition is especially clear in cases of street harassment. Kukla offers an interesting analysis of these deviations from the norms that govern standard invitations; she thinks our intuitions against expressing gratitude for a sexual invitation are the result of two “contingent sources”. She argues that perhaps there is a norm that calls for an expression of gratitude in some circumstances, for example, at the end of a date that has gone well, an appropriate response to a sexual invitation might be something like “that’s sweet of you to offer, but no thanks.” However, we live in a world with so many sexual invitations that are inappropriate, and where it is often the case that ‘no’ is not taken for an answer. We ought not express gratitude for inappropriate invitations, and it is often risky/dangerous if those issuing the invitation “sense any possible weakness or opening”, so we have good reason to not express gratitude even if it would be a norm-violation.
One thing we wondered about is how generalizable/culturally-specific these norms are supposed to be.
Kukla argues that in recognizing invitations as one of the distinct categories of speech acts that are typically used in initiating sexual encounters, we can expand our discussion of sexual ethics to include a new set of questions: what conditions make for appropriate and felicitous invitations? Who should be issuing them? When issuing an invitation, how ought we maintain a balance being welcoming and leaving the invited party free to decline?
Author note: this post was written collectively by the seminar participants.
This is the second part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of invitations.
Rebecca Kukla suggests that consent is only one of several important kinds of performative speech acts central to sexual ethics, and that too much focus on consent has distorted theorizing.
This is the second part of a series of three blog posts outlining the key features of different ways Kukla describes that sex can be initiated. This post focuses on the notion of invitations.
On Kukla’s view, invitations are a distinct category of speech acts which, along with gift offers (the subject of our next post), are an undertheorized kind of speech act for initiating sexual encounters. In fact, according to Kukla, most sex is initiated via invitation. It is characteristic of invitations that they leave the invited party free to decline without having transgressed, and the invitation must be welcoming (it cannot be indifferent). Kukla uses a dinner invitation to highlight these characteristic features; when extending an invitation, it is neither appropriate to say “if you don’t come, never mind, it doesn’t matter”, nor “I want you to come, and if you don’t I’ll be hurt”.
Invitations are an especially appropriate and common way to initiate a first sexual encounter with someone, as they are less presumptuous than requests or gift offers are. When an appropriate invitation is made, the possibility of sex is made available. Characteristically, the possibility is not neutral, the inviter hopes that the invitation will be accepted. Acceptance, on Kukla’s view, is one possible response to an invitation; the other obvious option is to decline. Kukla says that consent is not an appropriate response to an invitation, but rather something that one does or does not give when a request is made. As such, consent is not present in the initiation of most sexual activity; measuring the moral status of sex by the presence of consent upon initiation, then, is probably a wrongheaded way to think about sexual ethics.
Although our seminar found Kukla’s claim that consent is an inappropriate response to an invitation interesting, we were not all persuaded. That said, we did find that the idea that many sexual encounters are initiated through invitations to be a convincing one. We wondered why we shouldn’t think that one could consent to an invitation — indeed, whether accepting one counts as consenting to it.
Kukla argues that invitations are governed by social norms of propriety; we are not at liberty to issue any invitation we want just because the recipient is free to turn it down. For instance, it is inappropriate (and possibly insulting) to invite a stranger walking down the street to have sex with me. Likewise, there are norms that govern appropriate responses to having received an invitation. When an invitation is turned down, the recipient of the invitation offers their regrets and may provide a reason for their absence. Backing out of an invitation that has previously been accepted will also call for an expression of regret and an explanation. Not all explanations are acceptable; Kukla writes, “saying “I simply don’t feel like it any more” is not an acceptable reason to back out of a typical accepted invitation”. These norms also bear on the appropriate response of the party extending the invitation: Kukla believes that while rejection may be disappointing, the inviting party “has no license to feel aggrieved if the invitation is turned down”. The inviting party may, however, be aggrieved if acceptance is withdrawn in a cavalier manner.
Kukla argues that sexual invitations are peculiar in several ways with respect to the norms of propriety that govern them. Unlike other types of invitations, a sexual invitation may be declined without expression of regret, and acceptance of the invitation may be revoked at any time for any reason. She reasons that this special feature — being free to revoke acceptance at any time without justification and without having wronged the person who issued the invitation — may be common to all invitations to participate in “intimate bodily activities”. Another way in which sexual invitations are unique is that we do not typically think we owe an expression of gratitude if invited to have sex with someone. This intuition is especially clear in cases of street harassment. Kukla offers an interesting analysis of these deviations from the norms that govern standard invitations; she thinks our intuitions against expressing gratitude for a sexual invitation are the result of two “contingent sources”. She argues that perhaps there is a norm that calls for an expression of gratitude in some circumstances, for example, at the end of a date that has gone well, an appropriate response to a sexual invitation might be something like “that’s sweet of you to offer, but no thanks.” However, we live in a world with so many sexual invitations that are inappropriate, and where it is often the case that ‘no’ is not taken for an answer. We ought not express gratitude for inappropriate invitations, and it is often risky/dangerous if those issuing the invitation “sense any possible weakness or opening”, so we have good reason to not express gratitude even if it would be a norm-violation.
One thing we wondered about is how generalizable/culturally-specific these norms are supposed to be.
Kukla argues that in recognizing invitations as one of the distinct categories of speech acts that are typically used in initiating sexual encounters, we can expand our discussion of sexual ethics to include a new set of questions: what conditions make for appropriate and felicitous invitations? Who should be issuing them? When issuing an invitation, how ought we maintain a balance being welcoming and leaving the invited party free to decline?
Author note: this post was written collectively by the seminar participants.
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